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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner, :
v.

:

DENNIS RICHARD VIGH,

:

Case No. 930204-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Respondent. :
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The issue presented in this petition for rehearing is
whether the Court, in stating that "criminal histories are not
properly part of probable cause determinations," State v. VicTh,
Case No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. March 15, 1994),
overlooked and misapplied relevant Utah case law recognizing that
prior convictions may properly be included in a search warrant
affidavit as corroborative of inculpatory information received
from confidential sources, and/or as demonstrative of the
suspects' involvement in related, protracted and continuous
criminality.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement
of the case and facts is generally sufficient.

See State v.

Viqh, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 1-3 (Utah App. March 15, 1994)
(a copy of the opinion is attached as addendum A ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court's opinion incorrectly suggests that prior
convictions are never properly part of the magistrate's probable
cause determination.

While the Court may legitimately determine

that, under the totality of the circumstances, inclusion of
defendant's 1986 drug related convictions did not contribute a
great deal to the magistrate's determination that defendant was
currently involved in drug trafficking, that conclusion does not
warrant the Court's overbroad statement that prior convictions
are never properly included in the magistrate's assessment of
probable cause.

Indeed, the Court's opinion misapplies and

overlooks relevant Utah case law recognizing legitimate bases for
including a suspect's prior criminal history in the search
warrant affidavit.

Specifically, a suspect's prior convictions

are properly included in the search warrant affidavit to
corroborate information from confidential sources implicating the
suspect in related criminality.

For example, a suspect's prior

drug related convictions may .help to establish his/her
involvement in a protracted and ongoing criminal scheme like drug
trafficking.
Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion in
this case to recognize that defendant's prior drug related
convictions, though certainly not dispositive of the ultimate
probable cause determination, were nonetheless properly included
2

in the search warrant affidavit as at least corroborative of the
confidential informant's allegation of defendant's involvement in
drug trafficking.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has either "misapplied or overlooked [law] which materially
affects the result."

See Cummins v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-

73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).

The argument portion of this brief

will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
PRIOR CONVICTIONS MAY PROPERLY BE PART OF THE
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION FOR PURPOSES OF
CORROBORATING INCULPATORY INFORMATION
RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, AND
ALSO ESTABLISHING THE SUSPECT'S INVOLVEMENT
IN SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OF A PROTRACTED
AND CONTINUOUS NATURE
The State acknowledges that this Court affirmed
defendant's second and third degree felony convictions for drug
related offenses.

See State v. Viah, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at

1 (Utah App. March 15, 1994), see addendum A.

In so doing this

Court upheld the warrant supported search of defendant's mobile
home on the ground that the search warrant affidavit set forth a
substantial basis for the issuing magistrate's probable cause
determination.
A.

Viah, No. 930204-CA, slip op. at 5, see addendum

However, in assessing the totality of the facts upon which

the magistrate relied, this Court excised information concerning

3

defendant's prior drug related convictions1 on the ground the
information "may have been" improperly included.
930204-CA, slip op. at 4-5, see addendum A.

Vicrh, No.

Although the Court

ultimately and appropriately determined that the remaining
information was sufficient to establish probable cause to search
defendant's mobile home, id., see addendum A, the Court's
treatment of defendant's prior convictions conflicts with
relevant Utah case law.
Relying on State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), the Court prefaced its
determination to excise defendant's prior convictions by
reiterating its Brooks holding "that criminal histories are not
properly part of probable cause determinations because such
determinations center only on the likelihood that evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."

Vicrh, No. 930294-CA,

slip op. at 4 (citing Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644). The foregoing
sentence could reasonably lead the reader to believe that under
no circumstance should prior convictions be included in the
search warrant affidavit.

Such a conclusion is contrary to

relevant Utah case law recognizing the propriety of including a
suspects' prior convictions in a search warrant affidavit.

1

Defendant was previously convicted in 1986 for
arranging the sale of a controlled substance and attempted
distribution of a controlled substance, both third degree
felonies. See Br. of Appellee at 6-7.
4

A. State v. Brooks Is Clearly Erroneous and
Should be Overruled
For reasons set forth in its opening brief, the State
originally asked the Court to confine Brooks to the unique facts
of that case and not to read the opinion as precluding the use of
prior convictions in future search warrant affidavits.
Appellee at 22 (a copy is attached as addendum B).

Br. of

However, in

the interim, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of
stare decisis, including horizontal stare decisis, which requires
courts composed of multiple panels "to observe the prior
decisions of another."

State v. Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at

6 n.3 (Utah March 29, 1994).

The supreme court explained that

[h]orizontal stare decisis does not . . .
require that a panel adhere to its own or
another panel's prior decisions with the same
inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis.
Instead, although it may not do so lightly, a
panel may overrule its own or another panel's
decision where xthe decision is clearly
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to
render the prior decision inapplicable.'
Id. (citations omitted).

Further, because the decision to

overrule prior precedent is never lightly taken, the supreme
court set forth certain criteria indicating when erroneous
precedent may appropriately be overruled.

Those criteria include

the failure to "acknowledge[] prior authority" and to provide
meaningful ana: *?is and supporting authority.

Id. at 7.

For

reasons set forth, infra, in the body of this petition, Brooks is
a "clearly erroneous" opinion, which under the Menzies criteria,
should be overruled.

5

For the first time in Brooks, this Court asserted that
prior convictions are not properly part of the probable cause
determination.

849 P.2d at 644.2

Specifically, the Court

determined that information Brooks had a criminal history of drug
related offenses contributed nothing to the establishment of
probable cause to believe that he was involved in drug
trafficking and was therefore "not properly part of the [probable
cause determination]." Id.

However, as set forth in the State's

opening brief, Br. of Appellee at 18-22, see addendum B, the
central issue in Brooks was not the propriety of including
Brooks' criminal history in the affidavit, but whether the
informant's controlled buys from Brooks, which were also set
forth in the affidavit, provided a substantial basis for the
magistrate's probable cause determination.

849 P.2d at 643-45.

Consequently, neither the parties, nor the Court, focused on the
criminal history issue raised here.

This lack of focus is

reflected in the Brooks opinion which neither reviews nor
acknowledges contrary Utah case law recognizing that prior
convictions are properly included in the probable cause
determination for certain limited purposes.

2

The Court has since relied on Brooks in State v.
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993), holding that
infomation obtained from an informant that a convicted drug
dealer was then inside Potter's trailer was not properly part of
the probable cause determination for purposes of securing a
search warrant for Potter's trailer. But Cf. State v. Bailey,
675 P.2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah 1984) (upholding search warrant
affidavit in support of search warrant for suspected burglars'
apartment where police verified one of the suspects "had an
extensive record for burglary and auto theft").
€

Additionally, as set forth more fully in the State's
opening brief, there are at least two legitimate reasons for
including a suspects' prior convictions in the search warrant
affidavit.

Br. of Appellee at 18-22, see addendum B.

For

example, it is well established that a suspect's related prior
criminal history is properly included in the search warrant
affidavit as corroborative of inculpatory information gleaned
from a confidential informant.

See Jones v. United States, 362

U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (Court upheld search warrant affidavit
containing statement that Jones had previously admitted using
narcotics on the ground that the information "made the charge
against [Jones] much less subject to skepticism than would be
such a charge against one without such a history"); Bailey, 675
P.2d at 1204, 1206 (upholding affidavit based information
obtained from a confidential information, noting that police had
verified that one of the two burglary suspects "had an extensive
record for burglary and auto theft"); State v. Strombera, 783
P.2d 54, 55 (Utah App.) (noting defendant's prior conviction for
unlawful possession corroborated informant's assertions of his
involvement in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert.
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d
1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit adequately
established informant reliability based, in part, on officers'
verification of defendant's prior, drug related criminal record).
See also State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App. 1993)
(recognizing affiant officer's knowledge of illegal drug
7

possession suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales,"
helped to corroborate confidential informant's observations of
same).
A suspect's prior criminal history is also probative of
his/her continuous involvement in a similar, protracted criminal
enterprise.

State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App.

1993) (affirmatively noting that the affidavit recited facts
"indicating defendant was involved in continuous and ongoing
criminal activity at defendant's residence[,]" including "a
substantial history of controlled substance violations by
defendant involving her residence");

Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57

(trial court's finding that the magistrate reasonably believed
Stromberg was involved in "an ongoing pattern of marijuana use"
was "supported by information that [Stromberg] had previously
been convicted of a similar offense").

For example, as expressly

acknowledged in Singleton, drug trafficking is widely recognized
as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal activity, and
Singleton's prior drug related convictions properly helped to
establish her continuous involvement therein.

854 P.2d at 1021.

See also United States v. Rowel1, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd Cir.
1990) ("x [n]arcotics conspiracies are the very paradigm of the
continuing enterprises for which the courts have relaxed the
temporal requirements of non-staleness'") (quoting United States
v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd mem., 875
F.2d 857 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied,

U.S.

(1989)); United

States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597 (1st Cir. 1985) (drug
8

enterprise involving a network of suppliers, distributors, and
customers is not created and then willingly dismantled the next
day), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); United
States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3rd Cir. 1973)
("[p]rotracted and continuous activity is inherent in a largescale narcotics operation").
Although the decision to overrule a prior panel
decision is not lightly taken, applying the criteria set forth in
Menzies, it is significant that Brooks "is not the most weighty
of precedents."

Menzies, No. 880161, slip op. at 7.

Specifically, as noted previously, the opinion fails to explain
its departure from well established Utah case law, outlined
above, acknowledging the legitimate bases for including prior
convictions in a search warrant affidavit.

Id.

Indeed, the

opinion wholly fails to cite that line of authority.

Id.

Moreover, because neither party briefed the issue, it is likely
the Brooks panel "did not even realize that they were departing
from well-established Utah precedent."
op. at 7.

Menzies, No. 880161 slip

Finally, in stating that Brook's criminal record was

"not properly part of [the probable cause] determination,"
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644, the Brooks panel provided no meaningful
analysis or supporting authority.
at 7.

Menzies, No. 880161 slip op.

Based on the foregoing, insofar as Brooks suggests that

prior convictions are never properly included in a search warrant
affidavit, it is clearly erroneous and should be overruled.

9

B. Defendant's Prior Convictions Were
Properly Included in the Search Warrant
Affidavit
Notwithstanding, the Court may well determine that
defendant's 1986 drug related convictions contributed little to
the magistrate's probable cause determination.3

The State

agrees that the age of the prior criminal history relates to its
relevancy for purposes of establishing probable cause.

The more

remote the criminal history, the less likely it is to contribute
to the existence of current probable cause.

Cf. Stromberg, 783

P.2d at 55, 57 (approximately eight year old conviction for
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use).

Moreover,

under no circumstance could a suspect's prior criminal history
constitute the sole basis for the establishment of probable cause
to search.

However, neither is a suspect's criminal history to

be completely discarded.

The real issue then is the particular

weight to be accorded the suspect's prior convictions, under the

3

Indeed, as a further predicate to its decision to
excise defendant's prior convictions from the search warrant
affidavit, the Court cited Stromberg, for the proposition that
11
[s] tale information such as prior convictions cannot be the sole
basis for determining that probable cause exists." 783 P.2d at
56-57. As set forth, infra, in the body of this subsection, the
State does not dispute the Court's determination that prior
convictions alone are insufficient to establish current probable
cause. However, Stromberg provides negligible, if any, support
for the Court's conclusion. To the contrary, Stromberg
recognized that inclusion of Stromberg's then approximately eight
year old conviction for marijuana possession in the search
warrant affidavit supported the magistrate's determination that
"'there was an ongoing pattern of marijuana use in the home.'"
Id. at 57.
10

totality of the circumstances of each case.

See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983).
Certainly, an important factor for consideration is the
relationship of the prior criminal history to the current
allegation of criminality.

For example, a prior robbery

conviction may not be helpful in corroborating or demonstrating
that the suspect is currently engaged in drug trafficking.
However, as shown in Singleton, a prior record of drug related
offenses will certainly be probative of current allegations
implicating the suspect in a protracted drug trafficking scheme.
854 P.2d at 1021.

See also Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1204, 1206

(suspect's prior convictions for burglary and auto theft helped
to establish probable cause of his involvement in suspected
burglary and theft).

Because defendant's prior convictions were

drug related they are relevant and at least corroborative of the
informant's assertion of defendant's involvement in drug
possession and trafficking.

Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021;

Stromberg 783 P.2d at 57. Defendant's prior drug related
convictions may also properly suggest that his involvement was of
a protracted and ongoing nature.

Id.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the State respectfully
requests the Court to modify its opinion in this case and retract
any suggestion that a suspect's prior criminal history is never
properly part of the magistrate's probable cause determination.
In so doing, the Court should overrule Brooks and acknowledge
11

Utah case law recognizing the legitimate bases for including a
suspect's prior criminal history in the search warrant affidavit:
To corroborate inculpatory information received from confidential
sources and/or to establish the suspect's continuous involvement
in a protracted criminal enterprise.

Finally, the Court should

recognize that defendant's drug related convictions are relevant
to his current drug use and trafficking.

Thus, although the

convictions may have contributed little to the ultimate probable
cause determination, they are nonetheless corroborative of the
confidential informant's allegation of defendant's involvement in
related criminality.
The State certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~5Q day of March, 1994
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

HAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
GLEN T. CELLA, KING & KING, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 320,
Kaysville, Utah

84037, this ^jfTaay of March, 1994.
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DENNIS RICHARD VIGH,
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:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993), and
possession of cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993).

Because the foregoing

offenses were committed within a 1,000 feet of school property,
the convictions were enhanced to second degree felonies, under
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (Supp. 1993).
Defendant also appeals from a conviction for possession of
marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the warrant authorizing the search of

defendant's residence supported by probable cause?

A magistrate's probable cause determination is given
great deference on review.
(1983).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236

The affidavit supporting a search warrant application

must, however, provide a "'substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 915 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). The
"substantial basis" requirement entails limited review of the
magistrate's determination, asking only whether the affidavit
contains sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate
could have found probable cause.

See Gates 462 U.S. at 236.

This Court reviews the trial court's "factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a
'clearly erroneous' standard," and the trial court's conclusions
of law based thereon are reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.), cert, denied. No. 930182,
Aug. 11, 1993 (unpublished order).
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's

finding that counts I-II were committed within 1,000 feet of a
school for purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(5)(a) and (5)(c) (Supp. 1993)?
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, Utah
appellate courts view the evidence and all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.

State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985);

State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
2

A jury verdict will only be

reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah

1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381.
3.

Was^the evidence sufficient to support defendant's

conviction for possession of cocaine?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as
that set forth in issue (2), supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(1)(b)(ii)
(Supp. 1993) and possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii)
(Supp. 1993) . The State further charged the foregoing offenses
should be enhanced to second degree felonies, under Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (Supp. 1993), because they were
committed within a 1,000 feet of a school. Additionally, the
State charged defendant with possession of marijuana without tax
stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990) (R. 204).

3

Defendant filed multiple pro se motions, including a
motion to suppress contraband seized during a warrant-supported
search of his mobile home in alleged violation of the fourth
amendment (R. 40).
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, wherein
defendant was represented by privately retained counsel, the
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 77, 28687) .
A jury trial was held February 4, 1993 and defendant
was convicted as charged (R. 155, 160-162).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent,
enhanced terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison
for counts I-II, and one consecutive term of zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison for count III (R. 231, 246).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

The Warrant*Supported Search

The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant
affidavit (R. 79, attached as Addendum A).

The affidavit was

submitted by Officer Gary Haws of the Bountiful City Police
Department, an experienced narcotics officer, and had been
reviewed by a county attorney (R. 260-62, 324-27), see Addendum
A.

Officer Haws sought a warrant to search defendant's mobile

home for:
Controlled substances including marijuana and
cocaine [•] Items of drug paraphernalia [.]
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled
substances[.] Documents evidencing the

4

ownership and occupancy of the residence
(and) [m]oney.

1.

Confidential Informant

The affidavit set forth information obtained from a
confidential informant who received no "remuneration for the
information provided."

See Addendum A.

The informant told

Officer Haws that he/she "[was] knowledgeable about marijuana
because [he/she] had used it in the past."

Id.

The informant

then reported that defendant "is engaged in the sale of marijuana
and cocaine."

Id.

Specifically, the informant alleged he/she

had "seen" marijuana, cocaine and drug paraphernalia "in
[defendant's] presence" and "at [defendant's] residence during
the last 10 days."

Id.

The informant provided Officer Haws with

defendant's address, stating that defendant lived "a few blocks
south of Crown Billiards," in the "Clearfield Trailer Park, #66."

Additionally, the informant stated that "during the
last 10 days" he/she observed marijuana "in [defendant's]
presence in his (defendant's) vehicle."

See Addendum A.

The

informant described defendant/s vehicle as a "1988 Ford Tempo,
two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE."

Id.

Finally, the informant stated that defendant "was
selling a large amount of controlled substance" and that he
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consequently kept "a large amount of money" at Pam Tucker's1
home in Sunset, Utah.

See Addendum A.

According to the

informant, defendant had been under Tucker's home and "may have
stashed something there."
2.

Id.

Verification and Corroboration

Although Officer Haws had not previously known or
worked with the informant (R. 262-63), he and other investigating
officers were able to verify and corroborate the information
provided.

Specifically, investigating officers verified that

defendant lived in the Clearfield Trailer Park at #66. See
Addendum A.

The investigating officers were also able to verify

that a 1989 Ford with license plate number 217 EVE was registered
in defendant's name.

Id.

Officer Haws conducted a consensual search of Pam
Tucker's home in Sunset, Utah, and discovered "three to four
pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space."
Addendum A.
cash.

See

The search also revealed approximately $12,000 in

Id.
Finally, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal

history which revealed that defendant had been previously
convicted in June 1986 for arranging the sale of a controlled
substance, and attempted distribution of a controlled substance,

1

Although not stated in the affidavit, Officer Haws
testified at a subsequent hearing that Tucker was defendant's
girlfriend (R. 267-69).
€

both third degree felonies.

See Addendum A.2

Further,

defendant was charged with possession of controlled substances in
1980 and in 1983, and as recently as March, 1990, which latter
charge was "disposed of by diversion."

Id.

Based on the foregoing, the search warrant affidavit
requested authority to conduct a daytime search.

See Addendum A.

This request was buttressed by Officer Haws statement that he
believed the "information reliable based upon the fact that the
informant has come forward as a citizen and [was] not receiving
any renumeration for the information provided."
4.

Id.

Seizure of Evidence

The search warrant was issued as requested on June 16,
1992 (R. 79, 268, 282), see Addendum A.

Pursuant thereto,

officers seized approximately one pound of marijuana (R. 369),
and baggies, scales, and other drug paraphernalia containing
cocaine residue (R. 479-483).
Defendant was arrested just prior to the execution of
the search warrant, based on the discovery of contraband at Pam
Tucker's home (R. 372). The following items were seized incident
to defendant's arrest:

defendant's driver's license (which also

contained cocaine residue), approximately $6,028 in cash, and a
bottle of Prozac, in the name of another individual (R. 329-30,
492-93).

2

Officer Haws attached to the instant affidavit, copies
of a search warrant affidavit and search warrant executed in
December 1985, which apparently lead to defendant's 1986
convictions. See Addendum A.
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5. Motion to Suppress
Defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress the
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant-supported search of his
trailer (R. 40, attached as Addendum B).

Specifically, defendant

alleged that information concerning his prior criminal history
was improperly included in the search warrant affidavit in
violation of the fifth, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.

Id,

Defendant retained counsel to represent him at a
hearing on his various pro se motions held October 27, 1992 (R.
255).

In conjunction with the motion to suppress, defendant's

hearing counsel argued defendant's pro se motion for discovery
(R. 38-39), wherein defendant requested the State to reveal the
confidential informant's identity (R. 256). In support of his
motion, defendant examined Officer Haws in an attempt to
demonstrate the officer either intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly included false information in the affidavit (R. 259).
The court denied defendant's discovery motion,
concluding "there was no substantial preliminary showing that
Detective Haws intentionally or knowingly or with reckless
disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information
received from the informant [;],f thus, defendant had not
demonstrated a basis for identifying the informant (R. 91, a
complete copy of the trial court's Order is attached as Addendum
C).
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Concerning the motion to suppress, defendant's hearing
counsel made no additional argument, but recalled Officer Haws
(R. 281-286) . Following Officer Haws testimony, the trial court
similarly denied defendant's motion to suppress:
[T]he Court would find that under the law we
are required to look at the totality of the
circumstances and the information contained
in the affidavit for search warrants [sic]
and that information needs to be looked at in
whether or not it provides a substantial
basis for the magistrate to conclude that
there was probable cause to believe that
there was contraband or evidence of crime
located in a certain place and describe that
place with such specificity.
In looking at the affidavit that was
presented in this particular case,
particularly the information provided by the
confidential informant, when the reliability
of that informant was tested and determined
as was done by the officer herein, the Court
would find that in looking at the affidavit
as a whole, there is a substantial basis from
which the magistrate could have concluded
that there was contraband or evidence of
illegality in the trailer of the defendant
and as it was described, that trailer was
significant particularly for those executing
the warrant to know where to look, and
therefore the Court will deny the motion to
suppress.
(R. 286). The trial court subsequently filed written findings of
fact:
1. The confidential informant provided
Detective Gay Haws of the Davis Metro
Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his
place of residence, his use and possession of
controlled substances, his vehicle and his
criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with
information that drugs were being stored at
9

the residence of Pam Tucker along with a
large amount of cash.
3. Detective Haws went to the residence of
Pam Tucker and located approximately [six]
pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by
the informant.
4. Detective Haws was able to confirm the
information relative to defendant's
residence, vehicle and criminal background as
provided by the informant*
5. The informant received no renumeration
for any of the information given to Detective
Haws.
(R. 92) , see Addendum C.
Based on the foregoing findings, the court concluded
that the affidavit set forth "sufficient" probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant (R. 93), see Addendum C.
Defendant was represented by current defense counsel at trial (R.
298).

Defense counsel again raised the motion to suppress, but

asserted no new arguments:
I was not representing Mr. Vigh at that time,
but it's [sic] my understanding of case law
under those circumstances, I don't have to
reobject to the admission of this evidence
based on the same judge. So rather than
having me object to 38 pieces of evidence,
which Mr. McGuire called, I would just like
it known that I would object to the
introduction of any evidence obtained as a
result of the search which we contend was
obtained in violation of Mr. Vigh's
constitutional guarantees and so I will not
be making -- well, I would like this to serve
as a continuing objection to any evidence
obtained as a result of either of the search
warrants.
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(R. 306-07).

In reasserting the motion to suppress, defense

counsel incorporated evidence seized incident to defendant's
arrest (R. 307).
B.

Cocaine Residue

James Gaskill, of the Weber State University Crime
Laboratory, tested residue samples taken from the various drug
paraphernalia seized from defendant's trailer, as well as from
defendant's driver's license (R. 479-83, 492-493).

In all,

Gaskill performed three separate tests on the samples:

1) a

cobalt thiocyanate test, which revealed the presence of cocaine
hydrochloride; 2) a gold bromide test, which revealed the
presence of recrystallized cocaine; and 3) a gas chromatography
test, which similarly confirmed that the samples contained
cocaine (R. 480-81, 492-93).
Although there was a sufficient amount of residue upon
which to conduct the foregoing tests, Gaskill was not able to
measure or otherwise quantify the cocaine residue (R. 485).
Further, Gaskill noted that the residue amounts were consumable,
but it was not likely the residue was a sufficient amount "for
any kind of reaction on the part of the individual who consumed
it" (R. 486).
C.

Sentence Enhancement

Investigating officers made several measurements to
determine that defendant's mobile home was located within 1,000
feet of Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center.
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The officers

obtained a blueprint of Clearfield City from the planning
division of Clearfield City Corporation (R. 416, Exh. 35). 3
After determining the blueprint was drawn to a scale of one inch
for every 400 feet, the officers drew a 1,000 foot radius
emanating from the center of the mobile home park, which radius
cut through the middle of the rehabilitation center property.

IdL
Additionally, Officer Haws used a roller-meter to
measure the distance from defendant's trailer to the
rehabilitation center, stepping off two different routes (R. 35558}.

The first pedestrian route measured 983 feet (R. 357). The

second, more direct route, measured 722 feet.

Id.

Both routes

required trespassing across railroad tracks running between the
rehabilitation center and the mobile home park (R. 360, Exh. 35).
The officer also climbed through some holes in a six foot chainlink fence surrounding the mobile home park (R. 359-60).

Officer

Haws estimated that a non-trespassory pedestrian route between
the center and defendant's trailer would accede 1,000 feet, but
did not make an exact measurement with the roller-meter (R. 36061) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the search
warrant affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the
magistrate's probable cause determination.
3

The affidavit

As depicted on the blueprint (Exh. 35), defendant's
mobile home park is outlined in red and the rehabilitation center
is outlined in blue (R. 416).
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properly included defendant's criminal history as corroborative
of the confidential informant's allegations concerning
defendant's involvement in drug trafficking.

Based on the

officer's corroboration of defendant's criminal history and other
information provided by the informant, there is no clear error in
the trial court's determination that the informant was reliable.
Thus, the trial court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable
cause determination should be upheld.
The evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt
to support the jury's finding that counts I-II were committed
within 1,000 feet of a school and were thus subject to an
enhanced penalty.

Defendant does not dispute evidence that his

mobile home was located within a 1,000 foot radius of the school.
Rather, defendant contends the method of measurement should take
into account physical and legal barriers separating the school
and the site of the offense.

However, the straight line method

for measuring the statutory distance used here is consistent with
the policy objectives underlying the school zone enhancement
provision and should be expressly adopted by the Court as the
proper method for determining the statutory distance.
As for defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, the
Court should not even consider it because defendant has not
properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
Even if the Court were to consider the merits of defendant's
claim, there was ample evidence before the jury to demonstrate
13

that defendant's possession of the cocaine residue was knowing
and intentional,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SETS FORTH A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AND THERE IS NO
CLEAR ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION CONCERNING THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY
Defendant challenges the trial court's affirmance of
the magistrate's probable cause determination, alleging that the
search warrant affidavit 1) improperly set forth defendant's
criminal history and 2) "contains no indication of veracity or
reliability regarding the confidential inf ormant [ • ] ff Br. of App.
at 9-11.

Contrary to defendant's assertions, his criminal

history was properly included in the affidavit as corroborative
of the confidential informant's allegation of defendant's
criminal conduct.

Moreover, there is no clear error in the trial

court's finding that the affidavit was sufficient to establish
the confidential informant's reliability.

Accordingly, the trial

court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable cause
determination was proper.
A. Deferential Review of Magistrate's
Probable Cause Determination
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing
14

court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis" for determining that probable cause existed.

State v.

Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Avala. 762 P.2d
1107, 1110 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
In conducting its examination, the reviewing court "should
consider a search warrant affidavit %in its entirety and in a
common-sense fashion.'"

Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State

v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)); State v. Purser,
828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).

"Finally, the reviewing

court should pay 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision."
Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236 (1983)) .
B. Totality-of-the-Circumstances and
Informant Reliability
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. However,
"[t]hey are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly
extracted' in every case."

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130

(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their
significance varies under the circumstances of each case.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailev. 675 P.2d 1203,
1205 (Utah 1984)).

For example, "if the circumstances as a whole

demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less
strong showing is required."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
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C.

The Instant Case

Applying the Gates test to Officer Haws' affidavit, the
truthfulness of the informant's report is adequately
demonstrated.

While the first time informant had not previously

supplied information to any of the investigating officers, that
fact is not critical to the probable cause determination because
-the informant's veracity and reliability is otherwise
demonstrated.

Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. See also United v.

Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 581-582 (1971) (upholding search warrant
affidavit based on information gleaned from a first time
informant; "this Court [has] never suggested that an averment of
previous reliability was necessary").

Accord State v. Germane

559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 1989); Meiia v. State. 761 S.W.2d 35,
39 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. Pavne. 271 N.W.2d 350, 351 (Neb.
1978).
1.

Confidential Informant's Veracity and Reliability

Indeed, "[c]ourts have consistently approved the
issuance of search warrants where the informant's knowledge is
based on personal observation."

Purser. 828 P.2d at Sl7. See

also State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), cert.
denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195,
1199 (Utah App. 1993).

Here, the affidavit clearly states the

.basis of the informant's knowledge was his/her first hand
observation of defendant's criminality.

See Addendum A.

Moreover, the observations were recent, occurring in the "last 10
days" prior to the warrant's issuance.
16

Id.

The informant's veracity is further buttressed by the
fact that he/she received nothing in exchange for the information
provided.

See Addendum A.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; State v.

Blaha, 851 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brooks. 849
P.2d 640, 645 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. No. 930182 (Utah
Aug. 11, 1993).

Similarly demonstrative of the informant's

veracity is the informant's admission against his/her penal
interest, that he/she had previously used marijuana.4
Addendum A.

See

Harris, 403 U.S. at 583-84 ("Admissions of crime,

like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own
indicia of credibility[.]"). Accord People v. TurcotteSchaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo. 1993); State v. Erwin, 789
S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. App. 1990); State v. O'Connor. 692 P.2d 208,
212 (Wash. App. 1984).

4

At trial, defendant was represented by current counsel,
who questioned Officer Haws concerning a search of the
confidential informant's residence conducted sometime prior to
the execution of the instant search warrant (R. 361-62) . The
officer testified that approximately six pounds of marijuana was
discovered and that the informant had not been charged with any
criminal conduct as a result of the search. Id. Defense counsel
did not further pursue the matter below, nor has he specifically
addressed it on appeal.
Rather, on appeal defendant merely asserts that the
affidavit "contradicts itself" because it states "that the
confidential informant is a citizen informant who is not
receiving renumeration, and then affirmatively assert [s] that the
informant is a known user of controlled substances." Br. of App.
at 10. However, contrary to defendant's allegation, the
foregoing conduct is not contradictory. Although the informant
was previously involved in drugs, he/she, for whatever reason,
decided to cooperate with law enforcement in this case.
17

2.

Independent Corroboration of Significant Facts

Additionally, the informant's reliability was manifest
by the officers' independent corroboration of the significant
facts.

See Addendum A.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. As alleged by

the informant, the officers found approximately four pounds of
marijuana in the crawl space of Pam Tucker's home, as well as
$12,000 in cash.

See Addendum A.

The officers were also able to

verify defendant's address, and vehicle, consistent with the
information provided by the informant.

Id.

Because the

informant was found to be reliable concerning the above
information, his/her assertion that defendant was involved in
drug trafficking was therefore likely to be similarly reliable.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be
right about some things, he is probably right about other facts
that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the
tip is engaged in criminal activity).
As further corroboration of the informant's
allegations, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal history
which indicated defendant had two prior convictions for drug
related offenses in 1986, as well as a 1990 charge for possession
of a controlled substance which was "disposed of by diversion."
See Addendum A.

Relying on Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644, defendant

asserts his criminal record cannot properly "be considered in the
probable cause determination."

Br. of App. at 9.

reliance on Brooks is misplaced.

18

Defendant's

In Brooks, the Court determined that information Brooks
was under investigation for drug trafficking in a neighboring
jurisdiction, and also had a criminal history of drug related
offenses, did nothing to establish probable cause that he was
involved in drug trafficking at the time the search warrant was
issued.

849 P.2d at 644. However, the central issue in Brooks

was not the propriety of including Brooks' criminal history in
the affidavit, but whether the informant's controlled buys from
Brooks, which were also set forth in the affidavit, provided a
substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause
determination.

849 P.2d at 643-45. Thus, neither the parties,

nor the Court, focused on the criminal history issue raised here.
This lack of focus is demonstrated in the Court's
comments concerning inclusion of Brooks' criminal history in the
search warrant affidavit.

Specifically, the Court neither

reviewed nor acknowledged relevant authority from the United
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
recognizing that a defendant's prior criminal history is properly
included in a search warrant affidavit as corroborative of the
informant's assertions of criminality.

See Jones v. United

States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (Court upheld search warrant
affidavit containing statement that Jones had previously admitted
using narcotics on the ground that the information "made the
charge against [Jones] much less subject to scepticism than would
be such a charge against one without such a history11); Bailev,
675 P.2d at 1206 (upholding search warrant affidavit where there
19

was "prior verification of significant facts [,]" including "a
prior police record of the individual suspected of having
committed the crime"); Stromberq. 783 P.2d at 55 (noting
defendant's prior conviction for unlawful possession corroborated
informant's statements); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385
(Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit adequately established
informant reliability based, in part, on officers' verification
of defendant's prior criminal record).

Accord Commonwealth v.

Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Mass. 1993) (independent police
corroboration of informant's allegations properly included
defendant's criminal history); People v. Maldonado, 465 N.Y.S.2d
958, 962 (N.Y. Sup. 1983) (defendant's criminal history "is
corroborative in nature -- that is, there is much less skepticism
surrounding an informant's information than would be the case if
.the police were not aware of the defendant's prior, drug-related
criminal history"); State v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.
1986) (defendant's prior criminal record of drug-related offenses
corroborated details of informant's tip).
Further, in State v. Singleton, another panel of this
Court rejected a staleness challenge to the search warrant
affidavit on the ground the affidavit recited facts "indicating
[Singleton] was involved in continuous and ongoing criminal
activity," including delineation of "a substantial history of
controlled substance violations.11
1993).

854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App.

Thus, "[v]iewed under the totality of the circumstances,"

the Singleton court found the "information contained in the
20

affidavit sufficiently demonstrate[d] probable continuous and
contemporaneous criminal activity at defendant's residence."

Id.

On the other hand, the only indication Brooks was
involved in an ongoing drug trafficking scheme was a "concerned
citizen complaint that occurred some nine months earlier."
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644. Consequently, the Brooks affidavit,
unlike the Singleton affidavit, was found inadequate to establish
the probable existence of continuous criminal activity.

The

Court thus determined that inclusion of Brooks' criminal history
did not contribute to the probable cause determination in that
case.

Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644. See also State v. Potter, 221

Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding that fact
Potter was under investigation by local drug agencies and fact
that his companion was a convicted drug user, without more,
failed to establish controlled substances would presently be
found in his trailer).
However, had the facts alleged in the Brooks affidavit
established ongoing criminal activity, Brooks' criminal record
may well have properly contributed to the probable cause
determination.

See, e.g., Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021.

Additionally, although the Brooks panel failed to consider the
issue, Brooks' criminal record was at least corroborative of the
informant's allegations and was arguably properly included in the
affidavit on that ground.

See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271; Bailey.

675 P.2d at 1206; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55; Buford, 820 P.2d at
1385.

See also State v. Lee, No. 920566-CA, slip op. at 12 (Utah
21

App. October 22, 1993) (recognizing affiant officer's knowledge
of suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales,ff helped to
corroborate confidential informant's observations of
criminality).

For these reasons, the Brooks analysis is

meaningful only as applied to the unique facts of that case and
should not be read to preclude consideration of a suspect's
criminal history in all cases. Thus, Brooks notwithstanding,
defendant's criminal history was properly included in the search
warrant affidavit if for no other purpose than to corroborate the
informant's allegations of defendant's criminality.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the search warrant
affidavit, defendant's assertions fail to demonstrate any clear
error in the trial court's determination that the informant's
reliability was adequately established (R. 286). See also (R.
92), see Addendum C.

Brooks v. State, 431 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. App.

1993) (trial court's determination of informant reliability
subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review).

Accord

Brooks, 849 P.2d at 643 ("factual findings underlying the denial
of a motion to suppress evidence" are reviewed under a 'clearly
erroneous' standard).

The trial court's affirmance of the

magistrate's probable cause determination was proper and should
be upheld.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING THAT THE OFFENSES OCCURRED
WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL FOR PURPOSES OF
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(5) (a) and 8(5) (c) (SUPP. 1993)
Defendant contends "[t]here is insufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict that [defendant's actions took place
within 1,000 feet of a school."

Br. of App. at 11.

In so

arguing, "[d]efendant asks the Court to define the most direct
non-trespassory route available as the proper measurement" for
calculating the distance from his mobile home to the school for
purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann. 58-378(5)(a), (c) (Supp. 1993).

Br. of App. at 16.

Defendant's

argument is inconsistent with the underlying policy objectives of
the statutory enhancement scheme and should be rejected.
A.

Sufficiency Standard

The power of this Court to review a jury verdict
challenged on sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited."
v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 783 (Utah App. 1990).

State

As this Court has

recognized,
[i]n challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, the burden on the defendant is
heavy. Defendant must 'marshal all evidence
supporting the jury's verdict and must then
show how this marshaled evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict.'
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations
omitted), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
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B.

The Instant Case

Although defendant has marshaled the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict, Br. of App. at 12-13, he has not
demonstrated that, viewed in its most favorable light, the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's enhancement
verdict.

Specifically, defendant does not dispute evidence that

his mobile home is located within a 1,000 foot radius of the
rehabilitation center.

Br. of App. at 16. Rather,

notwithstanding the evidence, defendant contends the straight
line method used to calculate the statutory distance (R. 416,
Exh. 35) is improper because it does not take into account chainlink fencing surrounding the mobile home park, or railroad
property rights.

Br. of App. at 16.5 Defendant suggests a

proper measuring system under the statute would take into account
physical and legal barriers between the school and the site of
the offense.

Defendant's tortuous reading of the enhancement

provision should be rejected.
1. Utah's Enhancement Provision
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (ix) (Supp. 1993)
provides for the enhancement of certain drug related offenses
committed "within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections 5(a)(i) through (viii)[.]
5

Defendant also asserts that the rehabilitation center
is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. Br. of App. at 16.
However, defendant provides no record support for this assertion.
State v. Cook. 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); State v. Bingham,
684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) (reviewing court cannot consider
matters outside of the record).
24

Subsection (5)(a)(ii) prohibits the commission of drug related
offenses "in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools[.]"6
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
6

As noted, section 58-37-8 (5) (a) enumerates several
locations or zones where, if a drug related offense is committed
therein, the perpetrator is subject to enhanced "penalties and
classifications under [s]ubsection (5)(b)[.]M However,
subsection (5)(b) provides only for the enhancement of first
degree felony convictions. The enhancement of convictions which
are "less than a first degree felony" is addressed in subsection
(5)(c), which subsection is not expressly referenced in
subsection (5)(a).
The legislature's failure to expressly refer to both
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c) in subsection (5)(a) is
merely a technical omission and should not be read to prohibit
enhancement of convictions other than first degree felony
convictions. Indeed, the school zone enhancement provision only
makes sense when subsection (5)(a) is read to incorporate both
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c). The only logical
construction of subsection (5) is that the legislature intended
to enhance any conviction for a drug-related offense committed
within the prohibited areas specified in subsection (5)(a). To
construe the statute otherwise is to defeat its purpose. See
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035
(Utah 1971) ("where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a
portion of a statute, it is proper to look to the entire act in
order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be
chosen which best harmonizes with its general purpose");
RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n., 741 P.2d 948, 951
(Utah 1987) ("a proper construction of the statute must further
its purposes"); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 749
P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988). See also Sutherland's
Stat.
Constr.
§46.05 at 103
(5th Ed.) ("a statutory subsection may not be considered in a
vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a
whole").
Finally, defendant has not complained of the matter on
appeal and the State's suggested construction has been implicitly
recognized by the Court- See State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54,
59-60 (Utah App. 1989) (affirming without comment Stromberg's
ehanced third degree felony conviction for unlawful possession of
marijuana within 1,000 feet of a public school), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
25

section 58-37-8(5) in State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Specifically, Moore argued that the school zone enhancement
provision violated equal protection because it "treat[ed] drug
dealers in small towns differently from those in large cities."
Id. at 503. The court's comments in rejecting Moore's
constitutional challenge suggest that a straight line method for
measuring the statutory distance is proper:

"'The bright line

test' is based strictly on distance from the school, regardless
of the town's population or configuration."

Id.

The "bright

line test" articulated in Moore is consistent with the supreme
court's recognition of the policy objectives underlying the
legislature's enactment of the school zone enhancement provision:
[U]nder the police power, the state
legislature has taken measures to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare of
children of Utah from the presumed extreme
potential danger created when drug
transactions occur on or near a school
ground.

Id-.
This Court has similarly upheld the constitutionality
of the enhancement provision,- and has also recognized the
legislature's intent to create a "drug-free zone"

around schools

"to protect children from the influence of drug-related
activity."

State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989)

emphasis added), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
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2

Federal Authority is Persuasive

It is significant that section 58-37-8(5) was
"fashioned" after the federal Controlled Substances Penalties •
Amendments Act of 3 984

Strombercr, 783 P.2d at 59 n.3.

The

federal act, which "increases the penalty for 'distributing,
possessing wit',h i:

:- .* to distribute, or manufacturing a

controlled substance

within enumerated distances from schools,

colleges, universities, and certain youth fac•; : ;'
number

-?

s

constitutional challenge.:

. J

Because Utah's enhancement provision is modeled after the federal
act, interpretative federal case law
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670

^

|>.»»<. ,a^:^

(Utah 1984)

bet

e.g.,

("Case law

developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may r ~ oersuasive in
" of t he Utah Con,-. ;.»: _*.. .on) .

applyi ng Article

At least three federal courts of appeal have expressly
rejected arguments similar to defendant's
"S": i -:-

*.

determining that the

• *! :iod is cleai ly contemp.ldt.ed t»y i he plain

meaning .:

ederal act-

F.2d 1079, 1088

(11th Cir.)

See United States v. Clavis. 956
("the

statutory distance must he

measured by a straight line method
travel route"), cert, denied. _ _

er than,, a pedestrian
U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2979

(1992); United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d 980 r
1989i

f

(" |Wjf in id i,lun t

^r.

i

(9th Cir.•'

stance between the school and the

sale should be measured b-7 * straight line
"pedestrian" route of travel

981

a:,i r.o-

any

~-,,_^,.i^ .v. • _. La>: il , 779
rejecting argument that the
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statutory distance should be measured by pedestrian route rather
than by straight line as "tortuous" of the statute's plain
meaning), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986).

Cf. United States

v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir.) (purpose of federal
act was to create a "1000-foot zone of protection" around
schools), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987).

See also United

States v. Robles, 814 F.Supp. 1249, 1251 (E.D.Pa. 1993) ("The
distance from the protected zone is measured by straight line,
not by pedestrian route.").

Accord State v. Wims. 847 P.2d 8, 12

(Wash. App. 1993) ("We adhere to the measurement of the
prohibited zone as the radius of a circle emanating from the
location of the school grounds.").
The reasoning behind adoption of a straight line method
for measuring the statutory distance is sound.

As noted by the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 1,000 foot zone of
prohibition around schools is
designed to protect school-children from the
direct and indirect dangers posed by the
narcotics trade. School children are not
known for taking what adults may conclude
would be the most appropriate routes to and*
from school. Only a straight line
measurement creates a readily ascertainable
zone of protection. . . . This intent to
create a %drug-free zone around schools,'
would be defeated if dealers were allowed to
escape prosecution by creating circuitous
routes to their narcotic transactions.
Watson, 887 F.2d at 981. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit similarly reasoned that
[t]he uncertainties created by the way a
child meanders, or a drug dealer or buyer
walks, is antithetical to the expressed
28

intention of Congress to create a drug-free
zone around each school. The way to create a
definite and identifiable zone is by
extending radii outward around the property
on which the school is located.
Clavis, 956 ;

..9,

Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject
defendant' s reading of Utal i' s school zone ei lhancement pi o1' ision
and expressly adopt a straight line method for measuring the
statutory distance.

Only the straight line method is consistent

with t hfj 1 t-^Isl at in P ' s ilc-'eii policy object; ive id creating drugfree zones around Utah's schools.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, Br. of
App. at 18-20, should be rejected for failure :; comply with the
marshaling requirements oi State v. Mooie,, n

"M; , ,?F \

(Utah App

supra, the

19 90).

As previously noted in Point 11

power of thi s Court to review a jury verdict challenged on
sufficiency of evidence is "quite 1 uniii ted

1d

Defendant must

fir st marshal all the supporting evidence, and then show how the
marshaled evidence is insufficient *
even when vieweu 84 4 P 2d J78l( 3P1

.
—..

denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

support the jury's verdict,
light.

State v. Lemons,

citations omitted), cert,

A.

Defendant's Failure to Marshal

Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy
burden.

Rather than marshalling all the evidence supporting the

jury's verdict and then demonstrating how the marshaled evidence
is insufficient to support his conviction for cocaine possession,
defendant asserts that cocaine soiled paper money is so prevalent
in our society "that one-third of all the people deplaning at
Salt Lake City from flights from Chicago, and carrying paper
money, could be charged and convicted of possession of cocaine."
Br. of App. at 19.

Significantly, although large amounts of cash

were seized from defendant's person and from his trailer, there
was no allegation below that the money was "cocaine soiled."
Thus, defendant's argument completely ignores the supporting
evidence.

The Court should refuse to consider defendant's

insufficiency claim based on his failure to properly marshal the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
B. Evidence Supports Jury's Determination
That Defendant's Possession Was Knowing and
Intentional
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's
sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to support
defendant's conviction.

Defendant does not argue that the State

failed to prove he exercised control over the cocaine residue
seized from his person, and from his trailer.

Br. of App. 17.

Nor does he dispute the narcotic character of the residue seized.
Id.

Defendant's only complaint is "that there was insufficient

cocaine to justify a conviction."
30

Id.

Specifically, defendant

a s s e r t s that society's r e s o u r c e s are bettei spent' prosecuting
suspects apprehended in p o s s e s s i o n of larger, q u a n t i f i a b l e
amounts :f controlled s u b s t a n c e s .

B r . of A p p . at 2 0 .

N e i t h e r t h i s Court; nor the Utah Supreme Coin t ha ve
expressly determined whether a particular quantity of narcotics
is necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic
St.ate v. Warner, 788 P. 2d 3 04.3 , 3 0431 (Utal :i hpi >. 1990) .7

drug

Rather, in Utah " [t]he determinative test is possession of a
narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug "
Winters, ] 2 Ut :ai i 2d 3 39

3:96 P 2d 872

State v.

874 (Utah 1964).

Further,

"the key in prosecuting for unlawful possession :: narcotics is
proving that 'the accused exercised dominion ar -

nXrol o^-ei the

drug with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character.'"
Warner, 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874).
The visible amount of dr ug i i I defendant s possession,
a., via with other circumstantial evidence, was sufficient for the
jury to determine that defendant's possession was knowing and
intentional

State v, fux, /U^ I~ 2d J 16, 319 (Utah 1986)

- is

significant that the visible cocaine residue in evidence was
discovered inside drug paraphernalia seized from defendant's
trail "lei" IH

4 7 u if I)

premise/." ever which defendant exercised

control and exclusive occupancy

Id.

Cocaine residue was also

discovered inside the plastic flap of defendant's d r i v e r ' S
7

However, both have acknowledged that "*several courts
have held that no particular quantity of narcotics is necessary
to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic drug.'"
Warner. 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting State v. Winters, 3 96 P.2d 8 7 2,
874 (Utah 1964)).

license (R. 492-93), a personal effect over which he had special
control.

Fox. 709 P.2d at 319. Thus, viewed in its proper light

on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides substantial
support for the jury's verdict.

This Court should reject

defendant's sufficiency challenge.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be upheld and
defendant's convictions affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15

day of November, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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84 037, this /O

day of November, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
80C West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

I

In Re: Search of the mobile home:
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer:
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard :
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
:
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.
:

COUNTY OF DAVIS
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

%

) ss.
VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the

undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that there
is probable cause to believe that on the premises find \ a h if Ilk1"
described as follows:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh*
there is now certain property or evidence described as:
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money

and that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired and is
being unlawfully possessed and is evidence of the crime of
possession of controlled substances.
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. Affiant received information from a confidential
informant that Dennis Richard Vigh is engaged in the sale of
marijuana and cocaine.

The informant stated that Vigh resides in

Clearfield at the Clearfield Trailer Park, #66, located a few
blocks south of Crown Billiards. The informant stated that
marijuana was seen in the presence of Vigh personally by the
informant and the informant is knowledgeable about marijuana
because the informant has used it in the past.

The informant

also indicated that cocaine and paraphernalia had been seen by
the informant in Vigh's presence.

Both of the items had been

seen at Vigh's residence during the last 10 days.
2.

The informant stated that Vigh had been under the

home of Peon Tucker in Sunset and believed he may have stashed
something there.

The informant further stated that the informant

believed that Vigh also kept a large amount of money at Tucker's
residence.
3. The informant stated that during the last 10 days
the informant had also observed marijuana in Vigh's presence in
his vehicle.

The vehicle was described as a 1988 Ford Tempo,

two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE.
4.

The informant stated that Vigh was selling a large

amount of controlled substances sufficient to store house a large

amount of money which was kept

Tucker's residence and that of

Vigh' s mo ther" wh o 11 ve s. i i i t .
Affiant went to Pam Tucker's residence located at
261 West 1425 North, Sunset and conducted a search of that
residence.

r

pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space.
Affiant also located a large amount of money totalling
appro
Affiant spoke with Detective Dave Nance who stated
that he went
J ocat .ed

the Clearfield Trailer Park and observed I L to be
:

observec

j

He stated he looked at #66 and

to be a single wide mobile home, beige i n col or with

brown trim.

Affiant spoke with personnel, at CI earfie] d Po3 ice

Department who stated that the manager of Clearfield Trailer Park
indicated that Dennis Vigh lived at that address.
?

Ji f f i A 111 i' i, 1111111 I iiiM I l\». Lij11 i (i J I 111 6 p a t c 11 fi n J w o s

informed that Vigh has a 1989 Ford with license 217 EVE, vin
#1FAPP31X7KK103453 registered to him.
8.

M I i.an!

obtained a criminal history on Vigh which

showed that Vigh was convicted on June 2, 1986 of Arranging for
the Sale of a Controlled Substances

a third degree felony and

ibution of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony.

Affiant observed a search warrant in that case, a copy

which is attached and made A part a! thlfc affida
also noted that Vigh was charged with Possession of Cocaine in
March, 1990. The records of the Davis County Attorneys Office
shov

aisposed of by diversion. The

criminal record also showed that Vigh was charged with possession
of controlled substances in 1980 and 1983.
9. Affiant believes that based upon affiant's
independent investigation, the information supplied by the
informant is accurate. Affiant further believes that the
information is reliable based upon the fact that the informant
has come forward as a citizen and is not receiving any
remuneration for the information provided.
10.

Affiant has been involved in the investigation of

controlled substance violations for over one year and during that
time has been involved in numerous searches of residences
involving individuals who sell controlled substances.

In each of

those instances, drug paraphernalia has been located.

Affiant is

also aware from experience and courses attended on the
investigation of such offenses, that individuals who sell
controlled substances often maintain records of such sales in
their residences.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a Search Warrant be
issued for the search of the above-described premises and vehicle
and the seizure of the items being searched for.

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
June, 1992.

Circuit Court Judge

day of

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
premises described as
450 South 546 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Kent Lewis, Davis County Metro Narcotic Strike Force, that he has
reason to believe that in the below-described premises there are
items which constitute evidence of the commission, of a crime.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime^to sake
*'^/J1|^»^• m i l t

&A

immediate search^of the premises described as:
450 South 546 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah,
and search for the following property:
Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of marijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical psilocyn.

And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court# County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
Court.
Given under my hand and dated this /2.

day of December,

1985.

Circuit Court Judge

LDREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT FOR
In Re: Search of the
premises described as
450 South 546 East, Apt.C,
Clearfield, Utah.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

Before K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, an officer
having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense, the undersigned, being first duly
sworn, deposes and says that he has probable cause to believe
that on the premises which are described as:
450 South 546 East Apt C
Clearfield, Utah,
there is now certain property described as:
Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of atarijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical psilocyn.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. On September 19, 1985f Agent Paul Rapp of the Davis
County Metro Narcotics Strike Force purchased marijuana from
Dennis Vigh.
2. On September 24, 1985, Agent Rapp purchased psilocyn
mushrooms from Dennis Vigh.
3. A confidential informant told Brian Wallace, Clinton
Police Department, that Dennis Vigh was selling marijuana from
his residence at 450 South 546 East, Apt C., Clinton, Utah.
4. A different confidential informant told Steve Hill,
Clearfield Police Department, that he or she, the informant, was
a resident of Townhouse Apartments which is the complex of the
above listed apartment, and that he had seen many persons coming
and going from the apartment at all hours of the night and day
and that the informant had witnessed exchanges at the door. Such
a pattern of traffic is typical of that where drugs are being
sold.
5.

A third confidential informant told Detective William

Holthaus of Clearfield Police Department that he had been in the
above-described apartment and had seen a dresser drawer filled
with marijuana on October 21, 1985.
6.

A fourth confidential informant advised Agent Rapp

and Agent Allen Larsen of the State Narcotics and Liquor Law
Enforcement Bureau, that Dennis Vigh sells marijuana from the
above-described location and this informant introduced Agent Rapp
to Vigh for the purpose of making the buys mentioned in

paragraphs 1 and 2 herein.

The information from this informant

is therefore considered reliable.
7.

your affiant is supervisory agent of the Davis County

Metro Narcotics Strike Force and in that capacity received the
information outlined herein from the agents and officers named.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of
any of the said items.

Ss)f<.f«-Ti

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to me this />-

day of December, 1985.

Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

^

J ^ R N 0 F SEARCH WARRANT

I hereby certify, and return, that by virtue of the within
Search Warrant to me directed, I have searched for the goods and
chattels therein named, at the place therein described: (Strike
either (1) or (2), whichever is inapplicable)
(1) and that I have such goods and chattels before the Court,
described as follows:

tot

and that I have been unable to find such goods and chattels,

^Jfl)

ar

I, \To/Ai/
rt.L'/£fi&C/',
the officer by whom this Warrant was executed, do swear that the above inventory contains a true
and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the Warrant

Office xl/kt
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
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Judge

I3

day of JJt<^-

t
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

t

In Re: Search of the mobile home:
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer:
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard :
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
:
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.
t

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss.

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by Affidavit having this day been made before me
by Gary Haws, Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, that there is
probable cause to believe that in the below-described premises
and vehicle there is property or evidence which:
(1) Was unlawfully acquired and is unlawfully
possessed.
(2)

Is evidence of the crime of possession of

controlled substances.
YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED to search the
premises and vehicle described as:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,

Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh.
and search for the following property or evidences
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money
If the same or any part thereof is discovered and seized, it may
be brought before the magistrate or retained in police custody
subject to further court order.
This Warrant shall be served in the daytime, and must
be served within ten days from the date of issuance.
Given under my hand and dated this
1992.

Circuit Court Judge

day of June,
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Telephone: 451-4300
IN T H E DISTRICT COURT O F T H E SECOND JUDICIAL

IN A N D FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS
:

vs.

:

DENNIS R, VIGH,

: Case N o s . 921700334 & 0336

Defendant.

: Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge

A series of motions filed b y the Defendant, came on for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 27th day of October,
1992.

T h e defendant

w a s present

and represented

b y David

Grindstaff, the State was represented b y William K. McGuire. The
Court heard testimony relative to some of the motions and received
memoranda from the parties relative t o the other motions and the
Court having considered the testimony and the memoranda, makes the
following rulings and orders on the motions:
MOTION T O SEVER
The Court has heretofore granted defendant's motion to
sever trial on the two files charging the defendant with criminal
offenses.
MOTION T O DISCOVER
The defendant requested copies of all police reports in
both cases as well as witnesses to b e called in each.

Pursuant to

O0IG059V

the answer of the plaintiff, it appears that all police reports and
witnesses have been submitted to the defendant and this request has
been complied with fully by the State of Utah.
Defendant

requested

disclosure

of

the

confidential

informant in Case No. 921700334 and testimony was taken relative to
the necessity of disclosure of the confidential informant.

Based

upon such testimony, the Court enters the following:
Findings of Facts
1.

The confidential informant provided Detective Gary

Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his place of residence,
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and
his criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with information
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along
with a large amount of cash.
3.

Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker

and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by the informant.
4.

Detective Haws was able to confirm the information

relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background
as provided by the informant.
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the
information given to Detective Haws.
The Court having entered its findings of fact, now makes
the following:

00160598

Conclusions of Law
1.
uetective

There was no substantial preliminary showing that

Haws

intentionally

or

knowingly

or

with

reckless

disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information
received from the informant•
2.

That probable cause existed for the issuance of the

search warrant based upon the information provided by the informant
and verified by Detective Haws.
The Court having

entered

its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law hereby Orders that pursuant to Rule 505 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, the identity of the informant should not be
disclosed.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Defendant's

request

for a bill

of

particulars

was

concerning

the

sufficiently answered by the State of Utah.
MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendant

requests

that

language

enhancement due to a prior conviction not be mentioned at trial nor
i
be read at trial and that the enhancement be dropped from the
language of the charge. The Court hereby orders that a bifurcated
proceeding should be followed in the trial of the case wherein the
enhancement language relative to the prior conviction shall not be
read to the jury as a part of the charge nor shall it be referred
to during the trial of the underlying charge.
the

defendant

is

convicted

of

the

In the event that

underlying

offense,

the

determination of a prior conviction shall then be presented for
enhancement

purposes.

The

Court

further

Orders

that

00160599

the

enhancement is not violative of the ex post facto provisions of the
United States Constitution, but that the prior conviction merely
enhances a subsequent act to make it more serious than it would
otherwise be had the individual not been convicted.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The Court heard testimony relative to defendant's motion
to suppress and based upon such testimony enters the following
Findings of Fact.
Findings of Facts
1.

The confidential informant provided Detective Gary

Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his place of residence,
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and
his criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with information
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along
with a large amount of cash.
3•

Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker

and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by the informant.
4.

Detective Haws was able to confirm the information

relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background
as provided by the informant.
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the
information given to Detective Haws.
The Court having entered its Findings of Facts, now makes
the following:

00i60G0G

Conclusions of Law
1.

That there was probable cause contained in the

affidavit sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant on
defendant's residence.
2.

That no showing of bias on the part of the judge or

of any erroneous information is present*
The Court having
Conclusions

entered its Findings of Fact and

of Law hereby Orders that defendant's motion to

suppress is denied.
MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court has previously ruled on defendant's motion to
dismiss finding that the bind over of the matters were pursuant to
sufficient probable cause for the sitting magistrate to bind the
matters over for trial. The Court has further reviewed the record
of the proceedings consistent with plaintiff's memorandum and finds
that there was no error in failing to postpone the preliminary
hearing at the request of the defendant, nor any problem with the
defendant

being

advised

of

the

charges

and

provided

with

information relative to the charges and therefore% defendant's
motion to dismiss is denied.
DATED this

R**- day of fl*yg^ I^A^

1992.

BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S J PAGE, Jiidge

00160601

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed an unexecuted

copy of the

foregoing Order on Defendant's Motions, with postage prepaid
thereon, to David L. Grindstaff, at 395 South 600 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84102, this igffi^day of October, 1992.

Secretary Q
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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1 5 1994

J ^•/•4 ^Mary T. Noonan
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Clerk of the Court

——ooOoo—OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 930204-CA

v.
Dennis Richard Vigh,

F I L E D
(March 1 5 , 1994)

Defendant and Appellant*

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys:

Glen T. Cella, Kaysville, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Dennis Richard Vigh appeals his convictions for possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute and for possession of
cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv),
(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1993). Because Vigh committed these two
offenses within 1000 feet of a school, his convictions were
enhanced to second degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(5)(a), (5)(c) (Supp. 1993). Vigh also appeals his conviction
for possession of marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105,
(1990). Vigh specifically challenges the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 16, 1992, Detective Gary Haws of the Davis County
Metro Narcotics Strike Force sought a search warrant for Vigh#s
mobile home in Clearfield, Utah. Detective Haws based his
probable cause affidavit on information from a confidential
informant and on independent verification of that information.

The affidavit contained the following information provided
by a confidential informant. The informant had telephoned
Detective Haws and reported Vigh was selling marijuana and
cocaine. The informant provided Vigh's address and descrit 1
Vigh^s vehicle to Detective Haws. Within the previous ten ays
the informant had observed marijuana, cocaine, and attendar . drug
paraphernalia in Vigh's residence as well as marijuana in igh's
vehicle. The informant was knowledgeable about marijuana oecause
of prior use. The informant also told Detective Haws tha^ Vigh
had been in the crawlspace underneath Pam Tucker's house in
Sunset, Utah. Tucker was Vigh's girlfriend. The informant
believed that Vigh had stashed drugs and money at Tucker's
residence.
Detective Haws, assisted by Detective Dave Nance, confirmed
the informant's assertion that Vigh resided at the Clearfield
Trailer Park with a drive-by observation and with the park
manager. Detective Haws also confirmed the informant's
description of Vigh's vehicle with Bountiful City Police.
Detective Haws went to the Tucker residence in Sunset, Utah and
conducted a consensual search. Detective Haws found three to
four pounds of marijuana in the crawlspace of the house.
Detective Haws also found approximately $12,000 in cash in the
master bedroom. Beyond his personal verification of the
confidential informant's story, Detective Haws believed the
information was reliable because the informant had come forward
voluntarily and had received nothing in exchange for the
information.
In addition, Detective Haws obtained Vigh's criminal history
which showed that Vigh had been convicted of a controlled
substance offense in 1986. Detective Haws attached the 1985
search warrant that resulted in Vigh's prior conviction to the
probable cause affidavit.
Judge K. Roger Bean of the Layton Circuit Court issued the
search warrant as requested by Detective Haws's affidavit.
Detectives arrested Vigh based on the contraband discovered at
the Tucker residence. Detectives then executed the warrant at
Vigh's mobile home and seized approximately one pound of
marijuana as well as baggies, scales, and other drug
paraphernalia which contained cocaine residue. Vigh's driver's
license likewise contained cocaine residue. Investigating
detectives also determined that Vigh's mobile home was located
within 1000 feet of a school.1

1. Vigh concedes that Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center is a
"school" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (Supp. 1993).
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finding of probable cause. The State also asserts that Vigh's
criminal history was properly included in the affidavit.
It is well settled that Utah courts employ the "totality-ofthe-circumstances test" articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 4£2
U.S. 213, 238# 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) zo
determine the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a sear_n
warrant. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-62 (Utah 1993);
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129-30 (Utah 1987); State v.
Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.)r cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993); State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
Probable cause is determined by a magistrate who 9,make[s] a
practical common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the
* veracity' and * basis of knowledge', of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates,
462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(I960)) (emphasis added).
We do not review a magistrate's probable cause determination
de novo; rather, we simply decide if the "magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State
v, Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991). To make that decision, we consider the
affidavit "in its entirety," State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
1102 (Utah 1985), and pay great deference to the magistrate's
determination. Collard, 810 P.2d at 886 (citing Gates, 462 U.S.
at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331).
The instant affidavit contains ten paragraphs. Nine
paragraphs recount the confidential informant's information and
independent police corroboration of that information. Only one
paragraph recounts Vigh's criminal record. We have held that
criminal histories are not properly part of probable cause
determinations because such determinations center only on the
likelihood that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952,
956 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding fact that local drug agencies
investigated defendant and fact that defendant's companion was a
convicted drug user, without more, did not establish probable
cause).
Stale information such as prior convictions cannot be the
sole basis for determining that probable cause exists. See State
v, Strorcberq, 783 P.2d 54, 56-57 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The stale facts in Vigh's case,
however, were limited to one paragraph and to the attachment of
the 1985 warrant. Including this information in the affidavit
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Vigh filed several pro se motions, including a motion to
suppress evidence seized at the mobile home. The motion to
suppress alleged that Vigh's prior criminal history was
improperly included in the affidavit in violation of his Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Vigh retained counsel
prior to the hearing on his various pro se motions. At that
hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Looking
at the affidavit as a whole, the trial court concluded that it
offered a substantial basis from which the magistrate could have
found sufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant.
At trial, James Gaskill of the Weber State University Crime
Laboratory testified that a white powdery residue visible on the
baggies, scales, and Vigh's driver's license was indeed cocaine.
The residue, however, was not measurable or quantifiable.
Gaskill further testified that the residue could be consumed but
that it was likely insufficient to produce a reaction. The
investigating detectives also testified that Vigh's mobile home
lay within 1000 feet of a school. The detectives' measurement,
however, required trespassing across the railroad tracks which
run between the school and the mobile home park. Detectives also
climbed through holes in the chain link fence surrounding the
mobile home park in making the measurement. Having heard this
testimony, the jury found Vigh guilty on the three charges and
found that Vigh committed the offenses within 1000 feet of a
school. Vigh now appeals.
ISSUES
Vigh's case presents three issues: (1) whether the
affidavit sufficiently established probable cause and thus
whether the trial court properly denied Vigh's motion to
suppress; (2) whether the cocaine residue was sufficient to
sustain Vigh's cocaine possession conviction; and (3) whether the
distance supporting the sentence enhancement should have been
measured irrespective of physical and legal barriers.
ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
Vigh contends that the trial court improperly denied his
motion to suppress when it concluded that the affidavit
established probable cause to issue the warrant that resulted in
Vigh's conviction. Vigh asserts that, without his prior criminal
history and the attachment of the 1985 warrant, Detective Haws's
affidavit is inadequate to establish probable cause. The State
responds that the affidavit provides a substantial basis for a
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When examining claims of insufficiency of evidence, we view
the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light mc.tr
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 12,
345 (Utah 1985); State v, Lemons. 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah op.
1992), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Jury verd: cs are
reversed only where reasonable minds must have entertainec a
reasonable doubt that defendants committed the crimes of which
they were convicted. Lemons. 844 P.2d at 381; State v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).
In Utah, ff[t]he determinative test is possession of a
narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug." state v.
Winters. 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875 (1964) (footnote
omitted). Furthermore, "the key in prosecuting for unlawful
possession of narcotics is proving that *the accused exercised
dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of its presence
and narcotic character.'" State v, Warner. 788 P.2d 1041, 1043
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874). In Warner,
we held that a white powdery residue of methamphetamine was
sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for possession
although the quantity was insufficient to produce a physical
effect. £&• at 1043-44. We affirmed the possession conviction
in Warner because the defendant exercised control over the drug
"with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character." ££. at
1043.
Vigh's case is analogous to the circumstances in Warner.
The cocaine residue was visible on the baggies, scales, and
Vigh's driver's license; however, it was not measurable or
quantifiable and was insufficient to produce a physical effect if
consumed. Nevertheless, police found the residue inside Vigh's
home in the context of drug paraphernalia and in Vigh's personal
effects, demonstrating that Vigh both knew of the drug's presence
and exercised control over it. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,
319 (Utah 1985) (holding not only knowledge of drug but also
intent to exercise control over drug necessary for possession
conviction). In addition, the context in which police found the
residue indicates not only possession but also distribution. The
residue itself is only part of the evidence supporting the
possession conviction.3 The drug residue must be viewed in the
context where it is found. See id.
Because police found the cocaine residue in the context of
drug paraphernalia over which Vigh exercised dominion, we

3. We have affirmed a possession conviction where there was no
physical evidence of the drug but only evidence that the
defendant had recently smoked marijuana. Provo Citv Corp. v.
SDQtts. 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Utah App. 1993) (following United
States v. Dolan. 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)).
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may have been improper,/but it was not fatal.2 Excise the stale
information, and this Affidavit remains viable. With the
criminal history paragraph deleted and the 1985 warrant removed,
the remaining information nonetheless demonstrates that "the
issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
there were enough facts within the affidavit to find that
probable cause existed." Collard, 810 P.2d at 885.
The remaining facts in the affidavit center on the
confidential informant's information and on police corroboration
of that information. In their probable cause determinations,
magistrates must consider the veracity and reliability of a
person supplying information to police officers. See Gates. 462
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. "[Reliability and veracity are
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from the police in exchange for the information."
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. Because the confidential informant here
received nothing in exchange for information about Vigh's illegal
activities, the magistrate properly assumed that the informant
was reliable. "Further buttressing reliability is the detail
with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts
by police." Id. Because the confidential informant offered
significant details such as the cash and drugs hidden at Tucker's
house and because police independently corroborated those
details, the magistrate properly determined the confidential
informant was reliable.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
even with Vigh's criminal record omitted the magistrate had a
substantial basis for finding probable cause and issuing the
search warrant. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
Vigh's motion to suppress.
B.

Sufficiency of Residue for Possession Conviction

Vigh also contends the evidence does not support the jury's
verdict that Vigh was guilty of cocaine possession. Vigh asserts
that because the cocaine residue was neither measurable nor
quantifiable he cannot be guilty of possession. The State
responds that the standard for possession is neither the amount
nor the useability of the drug but rather a defendant's knowledge
of the controlled substance's presence.

2. Vigh relies exclusively on Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644 for his
contention that including his criminal history proves fatal to
the affidavit. Vigh does not seem to recognize, however, that we
concluded the Brooks affidavit was sufficient to establish
probable cause even with the defendant's criminal history
omitted. Ifl. at 645.
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conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
Vigh controlled the drug with knowledge of its presence and its
narcotic character. Accordingly, the jury properly found Vigh
guilty of cocaine possession.
C.

Measurement of the 1000 Feet Sentence Enhancement

Vigh finally contends that sentence enhancement should be
measured not by a straight line but by the most direct nontrespassory pedestrian route.4 Such a measurement between Vigh's
mobile home and the school would exceed 1000 feet. The State
responds that a straight line method of measurement is the only
one consistent with the legislative purpose of the enhancement
statute.
The state legislature enacted the penalty enhancement
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58*37-8(5), "to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from the presumed
extreme potential danger created when drug transactions occur on
or near a school ground." State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 503
(Utah 1989). Therefore, the purpose of the sentence enhancement
statute is to create a "drug-free zone" around schools and other
specified structures "to protect children from the influence of
drug-related activity." State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 60
(Utah App. 1989), cert- tenijflf 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The
statute itself is silent as to how the 1000 feet should be
measured; moreover, Utah courts have not yet addressed the
measurement question.
Utah patterned its sentence enhancement provision after the
federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendment Act of 1984.
Strombera. 783 P.2d at 59 n.3; see 21 U.S.C.A. § 860(a) (Supp.
1993). Federal case law thus offers direction as we answer the
question of how best to effectuate the legislature's purpose when
measuring the distance for sentence enhancement. In United
States v. Clavis. 956 F.2d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir.), cert, denied.
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 2979 (1992), the court held that "the
statutory distance must be measured by a straight line method
4. Vigh characterizes his argument as a sufficiency challenge to
the jury's finding that his mobile home lay within 1000 feet of a
school. Vigh concedes, however, that, if the distance supporting
sentence enhancement is measured by a straight line, the State
clearly showed his offenses took place within 1000 feet of a
school. Vigh also concedes that courts have upheld the
constitutionality of Utah's sentence enhancement statute. State
v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); State v. Strombera. 783 P.2d
54, 61 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Vigh thus raises only the question of how 1000 feet should be
measured.
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rather than a pedestrian travel route." Additionally, the court
opined that " [t]he way to create a definite and identifiable
[drug-free] zone is by extending radii outward around the
property on which the school is located.11 J&. Perhaps even more
persuasive is United States v. Watson. 887 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.
1989) , where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sensibly reasoned
that f,[s]chool children are not known for taking what adults may
conclude would be the most appropriate routes to and from school.
Only a straight line measurement creates a readily ascertainable
zone of protection.11 Id. at 981.
For the purpose of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-38-8(5), we conclude that 1000 feet should be measured in a
straight line radius extending outward from the school's or other
specified structure's property. The 1000 feet should be measured
irrespective of fences, railroad tracks, walls, streams,
buildings, roads, and other physical or legal barriers. In
short, Utah's sentence enhancement is measured "as the crow
flies." Accordingly, the jury properly found that Vigh committed
two drug offenses within 1000 feet of a school, and the trial
court properly enhanced Vigh's sentences.
CONCLUSION
The affidavit supporting the search warrant that resulted in
Vigh's convictions provided a substantial basis for the
magistrate's finding of probable cause, even with Vigh's criminal
history excised. The trial court therefore properly denied
Vigh's motion to suppress. Moreover, the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Vigh
possessed cocaine and that Vigh committed the offenses within
1000 feet of a school. The jury thus properly found Vigh guilty
of cocaine possession, and the trial court properly enhanced his
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sentences. Accordingly, Vigh's convictions and their attendant
sentence enhancements are affirmed.

5^**^Norman H. Jackson, ^Kidge

I CONCUR:

Greenwood/*Judae
a TV. Greenwood,
>Judge

I CONCUR, EXCEPT THAT AS TO
SECTION A, I CONCUR ONLY
IN THE RESULT:

Gregory,**. Orme, Judge
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